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Abstract
This paper examines the stability of a small open economy under alternative
income taxation rules. Using a one-sector real business cycle model with external
increasing returns, we show that if the income taxation is progressive, the small
open economy will not generate equilibrium indeterminacy, but it exhibits a di-
verging behavior if the degree of external increasing returns is su¢ciently large.
In this case, a progressive tax schedule on the factor income may recover saddle
stability. We also reveal that if the taxation on the interest income from nancial
assets is regressive, then the small open economy may exhibit equilibrium inde-
terminacy. In this situation, progressive taxation is also useful for eliminating
sunspot-driven uctuations.
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1 Introduction
Does the income taxation rule act as a built-in stabilizer? This long-standing question
has attracted a renewed interest in public nance, ever since Guo and Lancing (1998)
revealed that progressive income taxation contributes to stabilizing an economy in
the presence of sunspot-driven business uctuations. Using a one-sector real business
cycle model with external increasing returns, Guo and Lansing (1998) demonstrated
that progressive income taxation narrows the parameter space in which equilibrium
indeterminacy emerges. They also conrmed that regressive income taxation enhances
the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy. Subsequent studies have reconsidered
Guo and Lansings nding in alternative settings such as two-sector real business cycle
models, models with productive public investment, models with utility-enhancing pub-
lic spending, and models of endogenous growth.1 Those studies have shown that the
taxation rule may play a decisive role in stabilizing the economy in various settings.
So far, the research on the stabilization e¤ect of income taxation rules has focused
on closed economies, and the role of taxation schemes for the stabilization e¤ect in open
economies has not yet been explored well. The purpose of this paper is to investigate
the relation between income tax schedules and the stability of a small-open economy.
We introduce the nonlinear taxation rule formulated by Guo and Lansing (1998) into a
prototype model of a one-sector, small open economy with free capital mobility. Based
on this analytical framework, we investigate which type of taxation rule contributes to
stabilizing the small open economy.
We obtain two main ndings. First, if the income taxation schedule is progressive,
the small open economy will not yield equilibrium indeterminacy, regardless of the
degree of external e¤ects associated with aggregate labor and capital. However, if the
aggregate production function holds a high level of external increasing returns, then the
equilibrium path of the small open economy diverges from the steady-state equilibrium.
1A sample includes Ben-Gad (2003), Chen, Hsu and Hsu (2018), Chen and Guo (2015, 2016,
2017), Dromoel and Pintus (2007, 2008), Gokan (2013), Greiner (2006), Guo and Harrison (2001,
2015), Lloyd-Braga, Modesto and Seegmuller (2008), and Zhang (2000).
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In this case, progressive income taxation contributes to stabilizing the economy in the
sense that it recovers saddle-point stability of the steady-state equilibrium.
Our second nding is that regressive taxation on the interest income from foreign
bonds may generate equilibrium indeterminacy, regardless of the taxation scheme ap-
plied to the domestic factor income. This means that, as far as the taxation on the
interest income is concerned, progressive taxation would act as a built-in stabilizer
in the sense that it may eliminate sunspot-driven uctuations. Therefore, our paper
shows that the main conclusion of Guo and Lansing (1998) generally holds in the open
economy counterpart as well.
Besides the literature on the stabilization e¤ect cited in Footnote 1, our paper
is closely related to the studies by Weder (2001), Lahiri (2001), Meng (2003) and
Meng and Velasco (2003, 2004), who examined equilibrium indeterminacy in small open
economies. Those early contributions utilized two sector models in which consumption
goods are traded, while investment goods are not traded. They showed that small open
economies tend to be volatile, because indeterminacy holds under weaker conditions
than in closed economies. We nd that such a conclusion does not hold in the one-
sector, small open economy model that is the standard analytical framework in the
open economy macroeconomics literature.2
We should point out that a few authors have examined the stabilization e¤ect of s-
cal policy rules in small open economies. Among others, Huang, Meng and Xue (2017)
introduced the balanced-budget rule à la Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) into a two-
sector small-open economy model with variable labor supply. These authors revealed
that the destabilizing e¤ect of the balanced-budget rule emphasized by Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (1997) does not necessarily hold in their small-open economy model. These
authors focused on the role of the balanced-budget rule and did not consider nonlinear
taxation. To the best of our knowledge, Zhang (2015) is the most closely related study
to our paper. By use of a two-sector small open economy model in which capital goods
2See Chapter 6 in Mino (2017) for a detailed discussion on equilibrium indeterminacy in open
economy models.
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are not traded, Zhang (2015) examined the stabilization e¤ect of the balanced budget
rule under Guo and Lansings (1998) taxation scheme. Although the research concern
of Zhangs study overlaps with our paper, Zhang (2015) did not analyze the role of
the taxation rule on the interest income from nancial assets. Therefore, Zhang (2015)
and our study are complements rather than substitutes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section constructs the
baseline model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium dynamics and inspects the
stabilization e¤ect of the taxation rule. Section 4 modies the base model by considering
alternative tax schedules. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this paper, we use the one-sector real business cycle model with investment ad-
justment costs that has been frequently used in open economy macroeconomics3. We
introduce production externalities and nonlinear taxation into the standard setting.
2.1 Production and Consumption
The analytical framework of our study is a small open economy version of the model
of Benhabib and Farmer (1994) which introduced production externalities into an oth-
erwise standard baseline model of real business cycles. The home country and the rest
of the world produce homogeneous goods. The aggregate production function of the
home country is given by
Yt = AK
a
tN
1 a
t
K at N
 (1 a)
t A > 0; 0 < a < 1; a <   1;  > 1  a;
where Yt is output, Kt is capital, Nt is labor, and Kt and Nt represent country-
specic, external e¤ects associated with the aggregate levels of capital and labor. In
3See Schmitt-Grohé,and Uribe (2017) for detailed discussion on this prototype model in open
economy macroeconomics.
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our representative-agent economy, the mass of agents is normalized to one, and, thus in
equilibrium, Kt = Kt and Nt = Nt hold for all t  0: Therefore, the social production
function is written as
Yt = AK

t N

t : (1)
The nal good and factor markets are assumed to be competitive, and the factor prices
are given by
rt = aAK
 1
t N

t ; wt = (1  a)AK

t N
 1
t ; (2)
where rt is the rate of return to capital and wt is the real wage rate.
Our formulation of a small open economy is the conventional one: domestic house-
holds freely lend to or borrow from foreign households, and international lending and
borrowing are carried out by trading foreign bonds under a given world interest rate.
The objective function of the representative household is the following lifetime utility:
U =
Z
1
0
e t log

Ct  
N1+t
1 + 

dt;  > 0;  > 0;
where  denotes a given time discount rate. In this paper, we assume that the represen-
tative household has the GreenwoodHercowitzHu¤man (GHH) preferences (Green-
wood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man, 1988). Under GHH preferences, there is no wealth e¤ect
on labor supply, so the labor supply solely depends on the real wage. As is well known,
the emergence of equilibrium indeterminacy in the Benhabib-Farmer model stems from
the wealth e¤ect on labor supply, coupled with the presence of strong externality that
makes the labor demand curve steeper than the Frisch labor supply curve. In this
paper, we exclude the wealth e¤ect to focus on income taxation rules rather than
on production and preference structures in discussing the equilibrium (in)determinacy
problem.
The households ow budget constraint is
_Bt = (1  y;t) (rtKt + wtNt)+(1   b;t)RBt 
"
It
Kt
+

2

It
Kt
2#
Kt Ct;  > 0; (3)
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where Bt denotes the stock of foreign bond (net asset position) held by domestic house-
holds, R is a given world interest rate,  b;t is the rate of tax on interest income,  y;t is
the rate of factor income tax, and It denotes gross investment on capital. Here, the
term (=2) (It=Kt)
2Kt represents the adjustment costs of investment. In this paper.
we assume that the home country is a lender to foreign households, so Bt has a posi-
tive value and the taxation on interest income is available. The capital stock changes
according to
_Kt = It   Kt; 0 <  < 1; (4)
where  denotes the rate of the depreciation of capital.
The household maximizes the lifetime utility U by controlling Ct; Nt and It subject
to (3) and (4) together with the initial condition on Kt and Bt as well as with the
no-Ponzi-game condition:
lim
t!1
e (1 b)RtBt  0: (5)
2.2 Taxation Rules
Following Guo and Lansing (1998), we assume that the scal authority adjusts each
rate of income taxes according to the following manner:
 y;t = 1  y

Y 
Yt
y
; 0 < y < 1; y < y < 1; y < 0; (6)
 b;t = 1  b

B
Bt
b
; 0 < b < 1; b < b < 1; b < 0: (7)
In the above, Yt = rtKt + wtNt denotes domestic factor income of the household
in period t and Y  is a reference level of factor income, which is represented by the
steady-state level of factor income. Similarly, the reference income in the case of the
taxation on the interest income is its steady- state level, RB: Hence, the taxation
rule is written as (7) on the interest income, RBt: In the above, the restrictions on y
and b mean that when Yt = Y
 holds, the average tax rates are between 0 and 1: In
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addition, parameters y and b;are given by
i =
i   1
i
; i = y; b:
In this taxation scheme, the rate of income tax is endogenously determined out of
the steady state, but it becomes an exogenously given at rate, 1   y and 1   b; at
the steady state. The restriction on i (i = y; b) ensures that the marginal tax revenue
of the government increases with households incomes at the steady state even if the
taxation schedule is regressive
 
y; b < 0

4:
The tax schedule given by (6) means that the marginal tax rate on the domestic
income is given by
d
dYt
( y;tYt) = 1 
 
1  y

y

Y t
Yt
y
;
which is higher (lower) than the average tax rate,  y;t if 0 < y < 1

y < y < 0

:
Thus, the taxation is progressive (regressive) if 0 < y < 1

y < y < 0

: The same
argument holds for the taxation on the interest income. Note that under (6) and (7) ;
the after-tax total income of the household is
(1   y;t)Yt + (1   b;t)RBt = yY
y (rtKt + wtNt)
1 y + bRB
bB
1 b
t :
Denoting the government consumption as Gt; the ow budget constraint for the
government is
Gt =  y;tYt +  b;tRBt =
"
1  y

Y 
Yt
y#
Yt +
"
1  b

B
Bt
b#
RBt (8)
4The governments revenue from factor income taxation is Ty = y;tYt =

1  y

Y 
Yt
y
Yt: Thus
dTy
dYt
= 1  y
 
1  y
Y 
Yt
y
;
which shows that the marginal tax revenue is positive at the steady state if 1 >
 
1  y

y; which
gives the minimum level of y: The same argument is applied to the taxation on the interest income.
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We assume that the government simply consumes its tax revenue, so that the govern-
ment spending a¤ects neither households welfare nor rms production activities.
2.3 The Optimal Conditions
To derive the optimization conditions for the household, we set up the following Hamil-
tonian function:
Ht = log

Ct  
N1+t
1 + 

+ qt (It   Kt)
+t
"
y(Y
)y (rtKt + wtNt)
1 y + bR (B
)b B
1 b
t  
"
It
Kt
+

2

It
Kt
2#
Kt   Ct
#
;
where qt and t respectively denote the utility prices of Kt and Bt:
Remember that when selecting Ct; Nt and It; the representative household takes
sequences of frt; wtg
1
t=0 as given. Therefore, noting that rtKt + wtNt = Yt; we nd
that the rst-order conditions for an optimum include the following:
max
Ct
Ht =)

Ct  
N1+t
1 + 
 1
= t; (9a)
max
Nt
Ht =)

Ct  
N1+t
1 + 
 1
Nt = ty
 
1  y
Y t
Yt
y
wt; (9b)
max
It
Ht =) qt = t

1 + 
It
Kt

; (9c)
_qt = (+ )qt   t
"
(1  y)y

Y t
Yt
y
rt +

2

It
Kt
2#
; (9d)
_t = t
"
  (1  b) b

B
Bt
b
R
#
; (9e)
together with the transversality condition: limt!1 e
 tqtKt = 0 and limt!1 e
 ttBt =
0.
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3 Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 Dynamic System
We nd that, using (2), conditions (9a) and (9b) yield
Nt =
 
1  y

y

Y 
Yt
y
(1  )
Yt
Nt
:
Substituting (1) into the above and solving it with respect to Nt; we obtain
Nt = 
K
!
t ; (10)
where

 =
 
1  y

y (1  a)A
1 yY y
 1
1+ (1 y) ; ! =

 
1  y

1 +   
 
1  y


: (11)
Equation (10) gives the equilibrium level of hours worked. Substituting (10) into (1)
presents a reduced form of aggregate production function in such a way that
Yt = A

K+!t : (12)
As a result, the pre-tax real rate of return to capital is expressed as
rt = a
Yt
Kt
= aA
K+! 1t : (13)
In what follows we impose the following restrictions on the parameter values:
1 +  >
 
1  y

 and  + ! < 1: (14)
In (14) ; the former condition makes the labor demand curve less steep than the Frisch
labor supply curve, and it ensures that  + ! > 0: Under the latter condition, the
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reduced-form aggregate production function exhibits decreasing returns to capital.
Equation (9a) gives
Ct =
1
t
+
N1+t
1 + 
; (15)
Using (9c) ; (9d) is written as follows:
_K t = Kt

1


qt
t
  1

  

; (16)
Denoting qt=t = vt and using (9e) ; (3) ; (15) ; (16) and (9d), we obtain the following
complete dynamic system with respect to Bt; vt, Kt and t :
_Bt = y

Y 
A
K+!t
y
A
K+!t + b

B
Bt
b
RBt
 

1

(vt   1) +
1
2
(vt   1)
2

Kt  
1
t
 
(
K!t )
1+
1 + 
; (17a)
_vt = vt  
"
(1  y)y

Y 
A
K+!t
y
aA
K+! 1t +
1
2
(vt   1)
2
#
+(1  b) b

B
Bt
b
Rvt; (17b)
_K t = Kt

1

(vt   1)  

; (17c)
_t = t
"
  (1  b) b

B
Bt
b
R
#
: (17d)
3.2 Steady-State Equilibrium
In the steady-state equilibrium, it holds that Yt = Y
 and Bt = B
: In (17d) ; the
steady-state condition, _t = 0; holds if and only if
 = (1  b)bR: (18)
10
We assume that (18) is fullled in order to dene a feasible steady-state equilibrium.
The steady-state condition for the aggregate capital stock, _K = 0 in (17c) gives
v =  + 1; (19)
which determines the steady-state level of relative utility price between the nancial
asset and the physical capital. Then the condition _vt = 0 in (17b), together with (18)
and (19), leads to
(+ ) ( + 1) = y(1  y)aA

K+! 1 +
2
2
:
Note that A
(K)+! 1 = Y =K: Hence, the steady-state level of output-capital
ratio is determined by
Y 
K
=
1
a

2 (+ ) ( + 1)  2
2y(1  y)

: (20)
In view of (11) ; we see that the the steady-state level of Y  satises
Y  = A
 
1  y

y (1  a)A
1 yY y
 
1+ (1 y) (K)+! :
This means that the relation between K and Y  is given by
Y  = A
1+ (1 y)
1+ 
 
1  y

y (1  a)A
1 y
 
1+  (K)
1+ (1 y)
1+ 
(+!) : (21)
Using (20) and (21) ;we can express the steady-state levels of Kt and Yt in terms
of the parameters involved in the model. When K is expressed as a function of
the parameters, from (10) the steady-state level of hours worked is determined by
N = 
(K) :
On the other hand, given (18) ; the steady-state levels of t and Ct are not deter-
mined by the conditions _Bt = _vt = _t = _Kt = 0: As usual in the standard small-open
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economy model with free capital mobility, the steady state levels of t and Ct are
pinned down by use of the intertemporal budget constraint for the household under
given initial values of K0 and B0: Note that the condition Bt = 0 means that
yA

K+! + bRB
 =

 +
2
2

K + C; (22)
where C = 1

+ N
1+
1+
: Since the magnitude of C depends on the initial levels of Kt
and Bt; the steady-state level of asset holding, B
 also depends on the initial conditions.
3.3 Taxation Rules and Equilibrium (In)determinacy
We linearize the dynamics system consisting of (17a) ; (17b) ; (17c) and (17d) at the
steady-state equilibrium. The coe¢cient matrix evaluated at the steady state is given
by
J =
2666666664
  

1

+ 

K S 1
()2
 
bv

B
 T 0
0
K

0 0
b

B
 0 0 0
3777777775
; (23)
where
S =
 
@ _Bt
@Kt
!

= y
 
1  y

( + !)
Y 
K
  

1 +

2

  !
1+ (K)!(1+) 1 ;
T =

@ _vt
@Kt


=  a
 
1  y

y
 
1  y

( + !)  1

A
 (K)(+!) 2 :
Note that T has a positive value, under (14) :
Let the eigenvalues of J be i (i = 1; 2; 3; 4) : Then we nd the following:
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = trace J = +  > 0; (24)
1234 = det J = b
KT
B
: (25)
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Since T > 0; if the tax schedule on the interest income is progressive
 
0 < y < 1

; then
det J > 0; meaning that either J has two stable roots or it has no stable root. Since
the dynamic system involves two jump variables, vr and r; the former shows that
equilibrium determinacy holds, whereas the latter means that there is no equilibrium
path converging to the steady-state equilibrium.
On the other hand, if the tax scheme on the interest income is regressive

b < b < 0

;
then det J < 0; and, hence, J has either one or three stable roots. If J has one sta-
ble root, the economy exhibits a diverging behavior unless it stays in the steady-state
equilibrium at the outset. If J has three stable roots, then equilibrium intermediacy
emerges at least around the steady state.
Since we cannot derive the exact analytical conditions that reveal the sign of each
eigenvalue of J; we examine numerical examples. In so doing, we set the baseline
parameter values (except for b) in the following way:
 = 0:02; A = 1; R = 0:03; : = 0:1;  = 1; a = 0:35;  = 0:4;  = 0:8;
y = 0:3; y = b = 0:7;  = 0:5:
In the above, the magnitudes of ; ; a and  are conventional ones. To satisfy (14) ; we
assume that there is a mild degree of externalities in aggregate production by setting
 +  = 1:2: Note that under our specications, ! = 0:2978 in (11) so  + ! =
0:638 2: Additionally, (20) yields Y =K = 0:647; which is not an unrealstic magnitude
at least for the US economy. Then we can derive the steady-state values of Kt; Yt; Nt
and vt as follows:
K = 0:9878; Y  = 0:5394; N = 0:1959; v = 1:1
We also nd that 
 = 0:348; S = 0:1971 and T = 0:0346: Since the steady-state levels
of t; Ct and Bt depend on the initial conditions, we assume that the initial levels of
K0 and B0 are set to satisfy C
 = 0:7Y  = 0:376; meaning that the income share of the
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private consumption is 0.7. Given this assumption, we nd that and B = 3:171 and
it holds that 1

= C   (N
)1+
1+
= 0:316.
We rst assume that the taxation on the interest income is progressive by setting
b = 0:3: Then we evaluate J based on the numerical values derived so far. We nd
that J has two positive and two negative real eigenvalues5. We change b between
0:1 and 0:4 to see that the number of stable root remains the same6. Therefore, if
a progressive taxation rule is applied to the interest income, the small open economy
tends to hold equilibrium determinacy around the steady-state equilibrium.
Next, we set b =  0:3; that is, the tax schedule on the interest income is regres-
sive. In this case, we nd that J has one positive and one negative real eigenvalue. In
addition J also has conjugate complex eigenvalues with negative real parts7. Conse-
quently, under a regressive tax schedule on the interest income, the economy exhibits
local indeterminacy of equilibrium. We change b between  0:1 and  0:4 and obtain
the same outcome. However, we also nd that if the taxation on the interest income
is too regressive, for example b =  0:6; then J has one positive and one negative
eigenvalue, together with conjugate complex eigenvalues with positive real parts. In
this case, the small open autonomy shows a diverging behavior, unless the economy
stays at the steady state at the outset.
The intuition behind the fact that regressive taxation on the interest income may
cause equilibrium indeterminacy is the following. Suppose that the small open economy
stays at the steady state in the initial period. Suppose further that a positive sunspot
shock raises the households expected permanent income and the household increases
consumption. This leads to a negative current account, so the net asset position of the
household, Bt; starts declining. Since the tax scheme on the interest income is regres-
sive, a lower Bt decreases the marginal after-tax interest income, b (1  b)
 
B
Bt
b R;
5In this specic example, the eigenvalues are:0:252 49; 0:04: 823 ;  0:008 923 ;  0:159 83:
6We also adjust b to hold (1  b) bR = :
7Specically, the eigenvaues are:
0:241 07;  0:02 865 1;  0:04: 910 1 + 0:010 19i;  0:04 910 1  0:010 19i:
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and thus, from (17d) ; the utility price of the nancial asset, t; starts rising. Hence,
consumption, Ct; decreases, by which the level of Bt will return to the original steady
state position. Such a self-stabilizing behavior of the economy allows the presence of
sunspot equilibria.
4 Alternative Taxation Rules
In this section, we examine two alternative taxation rules in order to conrm that the
dynamic behavior of the small open economy is sensitive to the tax schedule adopted
by the scal authority.
4.1 Linear Tax on the Interest Income
If the scal authority applies a linear taxation scheme on the interest income from
holding the nancial asset, we set b = 0 and b = 1   b; where  b 2 (0; 1) denotes a
at rate of tax on the interest income. In this case, we obtain the following dynamic
system:
_Bt = y

Y 
A
K+!t
y
A
K+!t + (1   b)RBt
 

1

(vt   1) +
1
2
(vt   1)
2

Kt  
1
t
 
(
K!t )
1+
1 + 
: (26a)
_vt = vt  
"
(1  y)y

Y 
A
K+!t
y
aA
K+! 1t +
1
2
(vt   1)
2
#
+(1   b)Rvt (26b)
_K t = Kt

1

(vt   1)  

; (26c)
_t = t [  (1   b)R] : (26d)
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As usual, we should assume that (1   b)R = ; so that t stays constant overtime.
It is to be noted that (26b) and (26c) constitute a complete dynamic system with
respect to Kt and vt: Linearizing (26b) and (26c) at the steady state in which _vt = _Kt
= 0 holds. we obtain the following coe¢cient matrix:
M =
2
4  [( + !) 1  y)  1]	
K

0
3
5 ;
where 	   (1  y)yaA

(K)+! 2 is a negative constant. Hence, we see that
sign detM = sign

( + !)
 
1  y

  1

:
Under our assumption the right hand of the above has a negative sign, so that (26b)
and (26c) establish a local saddle point stability. If we denote the stable arms on the
K  v plane as vt =  (Kt) ; we can conrm that 
0 (vt) < 0: Thus, the dynamic system
is reduced to the following:
_Bt = y

Y 
A
K+!t
y
A
K+!t + (1   b)RBt
 

1

( (Kt)  1) +
1
2
( (Kt)  1)
2

Kt  
1

 
(
K!t )
1+
1 + 
(27a)
_Kt = Kt

1

( (Kt)  1)  

(27b)
Equation (27b) indicates that Kt exhibits a self-stabilizing behavior, and it con-
verges to its steady-state level, K: WhenKt = K
 (so that Yt = Y
) ; (27a) is written
as
_Bt = yY
 + Bt   

1 +

2

K  
1

 
(N)1+
1 + 
; (28)
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where Bt denotes the level of Bt when Kt = K
 and Yt = Y
: In this case, the
intertemporal budget constraint for the household is
B0 +
1

yY
 =
1


1

+
(N)1+
1 + 
+ 

1 +

2

K

: (29)
If  is selected to satisfy (29) ; then(28) becomes
_Bt =  (B

t  B

0) ;
which means that _B0 = 0: As a result, an appropriate choice of  xes Bt at a steady-
state level when Kt converges to K
: Therefore, as far as ( + !)
 
1  y

< 1 is ful-
lled, the small open economy holds a unique stable equilibrium path that converges to
the steady state. However, either if the external e¤ects are strong ( i,e.  and  are large) or
if the degree of regressiveness of taxation is high enough, then it holds that ( + !)
 
1  y

>
1: As shown above, in this case, the economy diverges from the-steady state equilib-
rium. Such an unstable behavior of the economy can be avoided if the scal authority
adopts progressive taxation that satises ( + !)
 
1  y

< 1:
To sum up, if the scal authority xes the tax rate of the interest income and applies
nonlinear taxation to the factor income, then the small open economy will not exhibit
equilibrium indeterminacy. However, the economy would be totally unstable under
the presence of strong external e¤ects. In this case, a progressive tax schedule may
recover saddle stability of the economy. Hence, the progressive taxation contributes to
stabilizing the economy in the sense that is di¤erent from eliminating sunspot-driven
uctuations emphasized by Guo and Lansing (1998).
4.2 Tax Schedules without the Reference Income
So far, we have used the Guo-Lansing formulation of nonlinear taxation. Their for-
mula is convenient for model manipulation, because the average tax rate is exogenously
specied in the steady-state equilibrium. On the other hand, we should assume that
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(1  b) b = R to dene a feasible steady- state equilibrium. This restriction yields
a zero-root problem, which makes the steady-state levels of foreign bonds and con-
sumption depend on the initial conditions.8 To conrm that our main ndings have
nothing to do with the zero-root problem, we examine an alternative formulation of
nonlinear income taxes under which the steady-state level of foreign bonds is uniquely
determined. We now assume that the scal authority adjusts the average tax rates
according to the following rules:
 y;t = 1  yY
 y
t ; y < 1; (30)
 b;t = 1  b (RBt)
 b ; b < 1: (31)
In this case, the tax rules are progressive if 0 < y; b < 1; while they are regressive
if y; b < 0:
9 The after-tax incomes of the household are (1   y) (rtKt + wtNt) =
y (rtKt + wtNt)
1 y and (1   b) (RBt)
1 y ; and thus the ow budget constraint for
the household is
_Bt = y (rtKt + wtNt)
1 y + b (RBt)
1 b  

It
Kt
+

2

It
Kt

Kt   Ct: (32)
The optimization conditions for the households problem involve the following:

Ct  
N1+t
1 + 
 1
= t; (33a)

Ct  
N1+t
1 + 
 1
Nt = ty
 
1  y

(Yt)
 y wt; (33b)
qt = t

1 + 
It
Kt

; (33c)
8Given b (1  b)R = ; one of the eigenvalues of the coe¢cient matrix of the linearized dynamic
system is zero. See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe ( 2003).
9The amount of tax on the factor income is Ty;t = y;tYt = Yt   yY
1 y
t ; so that the marginal
tax payment is dTy;t=dYt = 1 
 
1  y

yY
 y
t ; which is larger (smaller) than the average tax, y;t:
Thus taxation is progressive (regressive) if 0 < y < 1
 
y < 0

: The same result holds for b:
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_qt = (+ )qt   t
"
y(1  y) (Yt)
 y rt +

2

It
Kt
2#
; (33d)
_t = t
h
  (1  b) b (RBt)
 b R
i
: (33e)
Since the before-tax real wage satises wt = (1  a)
Yt
Nt
; conditions (33a) and (33b)
yield
Nt =
 
1  y

y
 1
1+ Y
1 y
1+
t
Substituting the above into the production function (1) and solving it with respect to
Yt; we obtain the reduced form of the aggregate production function in such a way that
Yt =  K

t ; (34)
where
  =
n
A
 
1  y

y
 
1+
o 1+
1+ (1 y)
;  =
 (1 + )
1 +   
 
1  y


:
Using (34) ; we nd that a complete dynamic system is given by the following set of
di¤erential equations:
_Bt = y ( K

t )
1 y + b (RBt)
1 b  

1

(vt   1) +
1
2
(vt   1)
2

Kt;
 
1
t
 
(Nt)
1+
1 + 
; (35a)
_vt = vt  

(1  y)y ( K

t )
 y a K 1t +
1
2
(vt   1)
2

+(1  b) b (RBt)
 b Rvt; (35b)
_K t = Kt

1

(vt   1)  

; (35c)
_t = t
h
  (1  b) b (RBt)
 b R
i
: (35d)
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A distinctive feature of this model is that the steady-state levels of Bt; t and Ct
are independent of the initial conditions on the non-jump variables.10 First, _t = 0 in
(35d) gives the unique steady-state level of Bt as
B =
"
 
1  y

bR
1 y
#
 
1
y
:
Then, conditions _vt = _Kt = 0 in (35a) and (35c) determine the unique levels of K

and v: Finally, the steady state level of t is determined by _Bt = 0 condition in (35a) ;
which gives C = 1

+ (N
)1+
1+
; where N = N(K) depends on the level of K:
Concerning the equilibrium dynamics of the model, we obtain the same outcome
as that of the model with the reference income. We nd that the coe¢cient matrix
evaluated at the steady state may have two stable roots if the taxation scheme on
income is progressive, that is, 0 < y; b < 1: In this case, there exists a unique path
converging to the steady state. If the taxation scheme on the interest income, RBt
is regressive (b < 1) ; then the coe¢cient matrix may have three stable roots, which
leads to equilibrium indeterminacy. In this policy regime, although we cannot obtain
the analytical solution of K; we can nd plausible numerical examples that establish
equilibrium (in)determinacy. As a consequence, other than the fact that the steady-
state levels of net asset positions and consumption do not depend on the initial values
of Bt andKt; the alternative tax formula provides us with essentially the same outcome
as those obtained in the model with the reference income.
5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the stabilization e¤ect of income taxation rules in a small open
economy with free capital mobility. We have shown that in our small open economy, if
10Schmitt-Grohé. and Uribe ( 2003) presented some modications of the model in which the zero-
root problem is avoided. They proposed debt elastic world interest rates, endogenous time prefer-
ence rates, portfolio adjustment costs, etc. Our formulation of nonlinear taxation on the interest
income is an alternative idea to resolve the zero root problem. See also Lubick (2007) for this issue.
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the tax schedule on the interest income from nancial assets is progressive, equilibrium
indeterminacy will not emerge, even though the taxation rule on the factor income is
mildly regressive. However, if there is a strong degree of external increasing returns
or the degree of regressiveness of factor income taxes is high enough, then the econ-
omy displays a diverging behavior from the steady state. Therefore, progressive tax
rules contribute to stabilizing the economy in the sense that it may recover the saddle
stability of an otherwise diverged equilibrium path. We have also conrmed that if
the tax schedule on the interest income is regressive, then equilibrium indeterminacy
may emerge. In this case, the progressive tax rule on the interest income acts as a
built-in stabilizer in the sense that it eliminates sunspot-driven uctuations. Hence,
progressive income taxation is a useful automatic stabilizer in both senses. As in the
closed economy counterpart, those outcomes demonstrate that income taxation rules
would play a relevant role for the stability of small open economies.11
11Chen, Hu and Mino (2018) examine the stabilization e¤ect of nonlinear income taxation in a wide
class of small open economy models.
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